Anti-tobacco
activists portray themselves as enemies of “Big Tobacco,” so they naturally
characterize the current panic about vaping among American teens as a new
campaign by the industry. This is
fundamentally wrong, according to David Sweanor, a veteran anti-smoking
advocate and chair of the advisory board for the Center for Health Law, Policy
and Ethics at the University of Ottawa.
In the following guest blog, Sweanor suggests that the war against
vaping is cigarette manufacturers’ best hope for a lucrative future.
The
presence of the tobacco industry plays a huge role in discussions on tobacco
harm reduction and disruptive technology, but I have long found that those who
think they are that industry’s greatest enemies are often among its biggest
enablers. Yet understanding the fundamentals in play should not be so hard.
We can
start with what the financial markets appear to think of the state of these companies,
which is seen in the 5-year stock price charts at left. In early 2017, the
combined value of the FT500 tobacco companies (PMI, BAT/Reynolds, Altria, Japan
Tobacco, Imperial and ITC) surpassed US$700 billion. That was a continuation of
a longstanding skyward march of these companies as they benefitted from their
‘nicotine maintenance monopoly’ and raised prices in a cartel-like fashion.
Recently the combined value was down to US$372 billion. In looking at their
stock charts we can see clearly when disruption started to bite.
This makes
sense when we consider that those valuations are the present value of future
anticipated earnings. So long as the companies can, as in the US, make
cigarettes for 28 cents a pack and sell them, pre-taxes etc., for over $2.00,
and keep raising their prices aggressively, and price elasticity is low, it is
a licence to print money. Regulatory barriers thwarting competition keep them
secure.
But just as
OPEC’s cartel invited alternative sources of energy and taxi cartels created an
opportunity for Uber, the nicotine market has long been at risk of disruption,
of true competition breaking out. The global cigarette market, at well over
$US800 billion annually, huge profit margins, high tax burdens putting them at
a price disadvantage, and unhappy customers, creates a tempting target.
Regulations, public misinformation, actions by self-styled anti-tobacco groups, and technological
challenges protect the cartel. But that protection is no longer assured and
buying shares in Big Tobacco today starts to look a bit like buying into New
York City taxi medallions just as Uber was getting launched.
The idea that cigarette companies welcome this
disruption flies in the face of their stock prices. Yet many in the tobacco control
field seem convinced that whatever happens with new technology Big Tobacco will
win because, well, they have long dominated the market. Leaving aside that the
market apparently disagrees, this is worth thinking about. Disruption has hit a
great many businesses over a very long time. Would anyone care to list all the
market-dominating companies that did well from such disruption? They typically
get blown away, and for very good reasons. They are large, bureaucratic and
risk-averse, and have much to lose if they make mistakes. They also typically
lack the expertise in the emerging technologies and are held back by those in
the company who are committed to the status quo. Meanwhile, lots of start-ups
can compete for the emerging market with little to lose but huge upside if they
are ultimate winners.
Horse
breeders did not come to dominate the tractor business, nor horseless
carriages. IBM missed out on software, Microsoft on social media, the Yellow
Pages on internet search, NYC taxi medallion owners were not the backers of
Uber. Then there were makers of rotary dial phones, beat by the likes of
Motorola, in turn beaten by the likes of Nokia, which was trounced by
BlackBerry, which in turn lost out to Samsung and Apple. The list of big,
established, market-dominating companies ‘doing a Kodak’ is very, very long.
Also, if
Big Tobacco really wanted to facilitate a rapid transition to low risk products
they would act very differently. They are, after all, in possession of the best
market intelligence. They know what happens when vape products compete directly
with cigarettes. They know how many smokers would seriously try to switch if
adequately informed about relative risks, and they know how things like
risk-proportionate regulation and taxation is likely to impact the markets. But
they stay pretty quiet.
I think it
is helpful to think of Big Tobacco and alternative nicotine the way we would
think of the House of Saud and alternatives to fossil fuels. Big Tobacco must
prepare as best they can for a market they think is fundamentally changing.
They must sound like they are very supportive, for public relation and legal
liability reasons. But the slower the
transition, the longer they can reap the rewards of their exceedingly lucrative
cartel.
Substituting
market intelligence for the current ‘if they seem to want to do it, we will
oppose it’ thinking, and the application of some strategy could lead to some
quite extraordinary breakthroughs.